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A GAME CHANGER? THE IMPACT OF PADILLA
V. KENTUCKY ON THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RULE AND INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Joanna Rosenberg*
The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to effective assistance
of counsel when deciding whether to plead guilty. Defense counsel,
therefore, must ensure that his client understands the direct consequences
of the plea: the nature of the criminal charge and the sentence. However,
pursuant to the traditional collateral consequences rule employed by most
courts, counsel has no Sixth Amendment obligation to warn that criminal
defendant of so-called collateral consequences, such as mandatory sex
offender registration, civil commitment, or ineligibility for parole. Prior to
2010, deportation was also considered a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea in most jurisdictions.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court made deportation an
exception to the collateral consequences rule, and held for the first time
that counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
Lower courts have differed on whether to interpret Padilla as effecting a
change to the collateral consequences rule, and more specifically, how to
define direct consequences, in the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. This Note examines the conflict, and concludes that courts
should redefine the scope of direct consequences in light of the factors
considered by the Court in Padilla.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Dartmouth
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a noncitizen charged with a criminal offense. The
prosecution presents a plea bargain: you plead guilty in exchange for a
reduced prison sentence. Your case does not look promising, and the plea
bargain seems like a great offer. But is there a catch? An overwhelming
number of criminal offenses result in the deportation of noncitizens like you
Would you want your lawyer to tell you if accepting the guilty plea would
cause you to be deported? Almost certainly yes. But does your lawyer
have a constitutional duty to do this?
Until a few years ago, the answer was probably not. However, in Padilla
v. Kentucky,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to warn
his client that pleading guilty to a criminal drug charge would result in his
deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Recognizing the severity of a deportation
Sixth Amendment.2
consequence, the Court determined that Padilla’s counsel failed to give him
the constitutionally adequate assistance required under the Sixth
Amendment’s Counsel Clause.3 This decision by the Padilla Court has the
potential to effect a sea change in ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence.
The distinction between the direct and collateral consequences of a guilty
plea runs throughout both state and federal jurisprudence.4 Pursuant to the
collateral consequences rule, attorneys are constitutionally required to warn
their clients about direct consequences of a guilty plea, which typically

1. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Id. at 360.
3. Id. at 373–75.
4. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706–08 (2002).
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relate to the nature of the criminal charge and sentencing.5 By contrast,
attorneys are not required to warn their clients about collateral
consequences, which are usually noncriminal in nature.6 Deportation, the
consequence at issue in Padilla, was traditionally considered a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea because it is a civil, not a criminal,
consequence.7 Therefore, prior to Padilla, counsel was not constitutionally
required to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation consequences of a
guilty plea in most jurisdictions. However, the Padilla Court created a
categorical exception to the traditional rule: in order to provide effective
assistance of counsel, attorneys must warn criminal defendants when a
guilty plea could result in deportation.8 To reach this conclusion, however,
the Supreme Court refused to categorize deportation as either a direct or
collateral consequence. Instead, the Court focused on several features of
immigration law that render it “intimately related to the criminal process.”9
Lower courts have split regarding Padilla’s impact on the collateral
consequences rule.10 Some courts, referred to in this Note as “no impact”
courts, have held that Padilla is an outlier decision that has no impact on
the traditional distinction between direct and collateral consequences.11
These courts interpret Padilla’s holding to be limited to deportation.12 As a
result, these no impact courts deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims
based on counsel’s failure to warn of consequences traditionally considered
to be collateral.13 However, other courts, referred to in this Note as
“innovator” courts, have held that Padilla shifted the understanding of the
direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea for the purpose of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.14 Innovator courts have held that,
after Padilla, some traditional collateral consequences must be considered
direct under the existing collateral consequences rule.15
This Note examines Padilla and the split it has caused in the lower courts
where a defendant asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
upon a traditional collateral consequence that stems automatically from a
guilty plea, like deportation.16 Part I of this Note discusses the due process
5. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678, 694 (2008).
6. See id. at 678, 694.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000), abrogated by
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir.
1988), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
8. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
9. Id. at 365–66.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. Courts have also considered Padilla’s impact on the direct versus collateral
distinction when evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon a
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and constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea. After a brief
explanation of the collateral consequences rule and a historical summary of
relevant immigration law, Part I also describes the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Padilla, noting in particular the Court’s consideration of deportation as a
harm warranting not only a duty to avoid giving incorrect advice, but also
an affirmative duty to warn. Part II presents the emerging split among
lower courts regarding the impact of Padilla on the direct versus collateral
distinction. Finally, in Part III, this Note assesses the continued viability of
the collateral consequences rule, and the relevance of Padilla to the
ineffective assistance of counsel context. This Note concludes that while
the no impact courts are correct that Padilla did not eliminate the collateral
consequences rule, decisions of the innovator courts suggest a better result:
in light of the “unique nature of deportation” discussed in Padilla, courts
should redefine the scope of direct consequences.
I. PADILLA IN CONTEXT: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GUILTY
PLEAS, AND THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RULE
Part I begins by providing an overview of the way in which courts
evaluate the validity of a guilty plea. It tracks the development of the
collateral consequences rule, and the importation of that rule into the
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Next, this Part
surveys the immigration law landscape leading up to, and providing the
foundation for, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.17
Finally, this part presents the Supreme Court opinion in Padilla, and briefly

traditional collateral consequence that, unlike deportation, does not stem automatically from
a guilty plea. See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (evaluating
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon failure to warn of the possibility of
civil commitment); Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896, 2010 WL 2680333 (E.D. Mo.
July 1, 2010) (same); Brown v. Goodwin, Civil No. 09-211, 2010 WL 1930574 (D.N.J. May
11, 2010) (same); People v. Hughes, 953 N.E.2d 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (same); State v.
Carter, No. 12-1938, 2013 WL 4769414 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (same); Whipple v.
State, No. A12-1713, 2013 WL 2372168 (Minn. Ct. App. June 3, 2013) (same); Thomas v.
State, 365 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (same); see also People v. Floyd, No.
94K053487, 2012 WL 1414943 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Apr. 13, 2012) (evaluating an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon failure to warn of ineligibility for
citizenship). These decisions are outside the scope of this Note. The consequences at issue
in those cases present an additional variable—they operate differently than deportation. In
the context of civil commitment, for example, additional proceedings are warranted before a
defendant is civilly committed because of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Brown, 2010 WL
1930574, at *13 (“[Civil commitment] necessarily requires an individualized assessment of
each person that might—but not must—be civilly committed upon expiration of his prison
term . . . .”). Therefore, in order to isolate the Padilla effect, this Note focuses only on
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea, like
deportation. Furthermore, this Note is not intended to be a survey of all post-Padilla
collateral consequences cases. Discussion is limited to cases that provide an insightful
analysis of the Padilla decision.
17. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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summarizes the subsequent Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion on
remand.18
A. Guilty Pleas, Due Process, and Effective Assistance of Counsel
In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the defendant must enter the plea
voluntarily and knowingly,19 and the defendant must receive effective
assistance of counsel when deciding whether to accept the plea.20 This
section discusses both requirements in order to demonstrate how courts
imported the limiting test for a voluntary plea into the effective assistance
of counsel context. Part I.A.1 explains the origins of the “voluntary and
knowing” requirement, and how judicial interpretation of that requirement
led to the development of the collateral consequences rule. Part I.A.2 tracks
the incorporation of the collateral consequences rule into ineffective
assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
1. Voluntary and Knowing: The Development of the Collateral
Consequences Rule
When a defendant pleads guilty, he does more than admit he committed
the offense—he also waives his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before a
judge and jury.21 Therefore, in order for this waiver of rights to be valid
under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court requires that the
presiding judge ensure that the guilty plea is “voluntary” and “knowing.”22
In Brady v. United States,23 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the
“voluntariness” standard with respect to a guilty plea.24 In Brady, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant makes a voluntary, and therefore
valid, guilty plea if he is “fully aware of the direct consequences” of that
plea.25 Lower courts have interpreted this language from Brady to require a
judge to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, but

18. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
19. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
20. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1985).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
22. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ADJUDICATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1043 (8th ed. 2007) (discussing the “voluntary
and knowing” requirements set out by the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
23. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
24. Id. at 748.
25. Id. at 755 (“‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).’” (quoting Shelton v. United States,
246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958))).
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not the collateral consequences.26 This interpretation of Brady has been
termed the “collateral consequences rule.”27
While the Supreme Court has never expressly validated the rule,28 it is
widely recognized by lower courts in the context of evaluating the validity
of a guilty plea.29 Still, courts differ on how to define the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences.30 The prevailing definition of a
direct consequence31 is a consequence that is “definite, immediate, and
However, other courts distinguish direct
largely automatic.”32
consequences from collateral ones based on whether the particular
consequence is punitive or nonpunitive in nature.33 A third definition limits
the scope of direct consequences to those that remain within the control and
responsibility of the sentencing court.34 Based on these three definitions,
direct consequences typically relate to the nature of the charge and
sentencing, whereas collateral consequences are usually noncriminal in
nature.35
Due to the narrow definition of direct consequences, very few are widely
recognized. The most commonly accepted direct consequences are prison
terms, fines, and other criminal punishments imposed by the sentencing
judge.36 If a presiding judge fails to warn a defendant of these
consequences prior to the entry of a guilty plea, that plea is considered
involuntary and unknowing.37 On the other hand, typical collateral
consequences include, inter alia, mandatory sex offender registration,38 loss
26. See, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We
presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing
so, it excluded collateral consequences.”); see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95
IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009) (“Lower federal and state courts have created [the collateral
consequences] rule, stating that an individual’s guilty plea is constitutionally valid even if
that person was unaware of his conviction’s ‘collateral’ consequences.”).
27. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 26, at 124.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 730. But see Roberts, supra note 5, at 689
(questioning the soundness of the presumption that the Supreme Court intended such a
distinction).
30. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 689–93.
31. Id. at 689.
32. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (“The
distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the
result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the
defendant’s punishment.”).
33. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that a trial
court’s failure to warn of direct, but nonpunitive consequences of a guilty plea does not
“violate due process or render [the] plea involuntary”).
34. El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A collateral
consequence is one that ‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in
which that conviction was entered.’” (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27
(1st Cir. 2000))).
35. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 678.
36. See id. at 672.
37. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 727.
38. See, e.g., Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2008).
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of the right to vote,39 loss of the right to own a gun,40 revocation of a
driver’s license,41 and civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.42
Additionally, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla,43 twelve
circuits considered deportation a collateral consequence.44 Pursuant to the
collateral consequences rule, a defendant’s plea remains knowing and
voluntary—and, therefore, valid—even when a trial court fails to advise a
criminal defendant of these consequences.45
2. Adoption of the Collateral Consequences Rule into the Realm of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Jurisprudence
In addition to the due process requirement of a voluntary and knowing
plea, a defendant must also have had the effective assistance of counsel in
deciding to enter the guilty plea.46 This requirement originated from the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.47
a. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment’s Assistance of Counsel Clause provides, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”48 In a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has established that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel
is fundamentally important to a fair trial.49 The Court considered this right
so important that it further held that the right to counsel includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel.50 Two veins of ineffective assistance of
39. See, e.g., Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2009); Meaton v.
United States, 328 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1964).
40. See, e.g., Ruelas, 580 F.3d at 408.
41. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. See, e.g., George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984).
43. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s characterization of deportation in Padilla,
see infra Part I.C.2.
44. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated by
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated
by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000),
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir.
1993); Kandiel v. United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292–93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d
177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985),
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 464–66 (2d
Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Warren v. Richland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 223 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2000);
Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 784 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
50. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
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counsel exist. The first vein concerns government interference with the
way counsel conducts his defense.51 The second vein concerns defense
counsel’s actual ineffectiveness by failing to provide “adequate legal
assistance.”52 This Note—and the direct and collateral distinction—is
concerned with the latter vein.
Until 1984, the Supreme Court had not fully articulated a constitutional
standard regarding the actual effectiveness required of counsel’s
assistance.53 With its decision in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test that has since been used to evaluate
whether a counsel’s actual assistance in a criminal case satisfies the Sixth
Amendment.54 This two-part test is meant to ensure a fair trial.55
b. Creation and Extension of the Strickland Test
In order to advance a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the Strickland test requires that a defendant show first that “counsel’s
performance was deficient,” and second that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”56 The Strickland Court provided numerous
examples of attorney behavior that could qualify as ineffective assistance.57
However, the Court made clear that “these basic duties neither exhaustively
define[d] the obligations of counsel nor form[ed] a checklist for judicial
evaluation of attorney performance.”58 Instead, “[r]easonable professional
judgment” remained the overarching standard.59 The Strickland Court
stressed that bright-line rules for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
were inappropriate,60 and indicated that courts should evaluate ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on a case-by-case basis.61
51. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (barring attorney-client
consultation); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (barring defense counsel’s
summation at trial). This type of ineffective assistance of counsel is beyond the scope of this
Note.
52. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). For the purposes of this
Note, discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel refers to the second vein—an attorney’s
failure to provide “adequate legal assistance.”
53. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
54. Id. at 687.
55. Id. The proceeding at issue in Strickland was a capital sentencing proceeding, but
the Court declared that of little import. The same principles of ensuring a fair trial and
producing a just result applied to a capital sentencing proceeding just as they applied to a
bench trial. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 688 (finding that counsel has a duty of loyalty, to avoid conflicts of interest, to
advocate the defendant’s cause, to help the defendant make important decisions, to keep
defendant informed of developments in his case, and to use skill and knowledge to produce a
reliable trial).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 690.
60. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 711.
61. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 693 (noting that “[m]ore specific guidelines are not
appropriate” because “[r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional
in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another”). This language prompted Chin and
Holmes to criticize the lower courts’ adoption of the collateral consequences rule in the
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Just one year after Strickland, the Supreme Court extended application of
the Strickland test to pretrial proceedings in Hill v. Lockhart.62 The Court
held that “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”63 For purposes
of proving ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea context, the first
prong of Strickland remained identical to the standard that applied in the
trial or sentencing context.64 However, in order to satisfy the “prejudice”
prong of Strickland in the plea context, defendants must “show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”65
c. Adoption of the Collateral Consequences Rule into the
Strickland Analysis
The Strickland standard of “reasonable professional assistance” did not
provide a bright-line rule for lower courts to apply when facing an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, lower courts needed a
way to define the scope of “reasonable professional assistance” in the
context of a guilty plea.66 Therefore, these courts imported the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences from the due process context.
The general rule is that an attorney’s performance is considered
constitutionally deficient if he fails to advise a defendant of the direct
consequences of entering a guilty plea.67 By contrast, an attorney can
provide constitutionally adequate assistance without warning a defendant
about collateral consequences of a guilty plea.68

effective assistance of counsel context as running contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Strickland. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 709–12.
62. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
63. Id. at 58.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 59.
66. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 124.
67. See id.
68. Roberts, supra note 5, at 694. Some jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule,
where defense counsel provides affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral consequence of
a guilty plea. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[G]ross
misadvice concerning [a collateral consequence] can amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[W]hen [a defendant] is
grossly misinformed about [a collateral consequence] by his lawyer, and relies upon that
misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”). A circuit court has
never held that affirmative misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of a guilty plea
cannot result in ineffective assistance under any circumstances. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 386–87 (Alito, J., concurring). But see Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,
485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. at 356 (holding that the defense counsel’s mistaken advice
to his client about the potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea provided no basis
for vacating the defendant’s sentence); but see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388–89 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]ffirmative misadvice [does not] render[] an attorney’s assistance in
defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate.”). One major issue with the
affirmative misadvice exception is that it creates a “perverse incentive . . . [to] say nothing at
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Almost every lower court uses the collateral consequences rule to
evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.69 Three versions of the
rule have emerged.70 At one extreme, the Kentucky approach, used by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Padilla, finds both collateral consequences
and affirmative misadvice regarding those collateral consequences outside
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.71
Under this approach, counsel’s performance is constitutionally adequate
whether he fails to advise or misadvises the defendant of collateral
consequences of a proffered guilty plea.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the New Mexico approach imposes
an affirmative duty of accurate advice regarding direct and some collateral
consequences.72 New Mexico courts require an attorney to accurately
advise a client about a guilty plea consequence when it would be
unreasonable to withhold that advice.73
Finally, the majority approach, standing on middle ground, accepts the
traditional collateral consequences rule and the affirmative misadvice
exception.74 Under this approach, counsel’s performance is constitutionally
adequate where he fails to advise the defendant of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea, but falls short of the constitutional standard
where he provides affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral
consequence.75 The Supreme Court has never approved any version of the
collateral consequences rule in the ineffective assistance of counsel
context.76
B. The Immigration Foundations of Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Criminalization of Immigration Law
The Supreme Court began its decision in Padilla with an overview of the
changes in immigration law over the last ninety years.77 The Court

all about ‘collateral’ matters.” Roberts, supra note 26, at 119. “Judicial decisions that
incorporate the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misdavice exception deliver the
following message to lawyers and judges: it is better to say nothing than take the risk of
saying something wrong . . . .” Id. at 140.
69. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 706. For a discussion of the varying versions of the
collateral consequences rule applied to immigration consequences prior to Padilla, see
Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses Fundamental
Fairness and Leaves Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 38–40
(2012).
70. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177.
71. Id. at 177; see also Hew, supra note 69, at 40.
72. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177.
73. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
74. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177. This approach was used by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Padilla. Hew, supra note 69, at 40.
75. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177.
76. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1337
(2011).
77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2010).
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concluded that “these changes . . . have dramatically raised the stakes of a
noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”78 This section surveys relevant changes
in federal immigration law to introduce the immigration concerns
underlying the Padilla decision.
1. Statutorily Raising the Stakes of Deportation
The first federal laws governing deportation of aliens did not appear until
the late 1880s.79 Grounds for deportation were limited under these laws,
and typically included conditions existing at or prior to entry into the
United States.80
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 191781 (1917 Act) “radically
changed prior law”82 and linked criminal law to deportation for the first
time.83 The 1917 Act, which solidified restrictive immigration policy,84
was the first congressional act to make classes of aliens deportable based on
criminal conduct committed in the United States.85 However, the 1917 Act
did not call for automatic deportation of aliens guilty of certain offenses.86
Instead, it allowed judges the discretion to issue a judicial recommendation
against deportation (JRAD), which bound the executive branch to prevent
deportation.87 Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) held that section 3 of the 1917 Act permitted relief in deportation
proceedings for aliens who had departed and returned to the United States
after the grounds for deportation arose.88 In the years after the 1917 Act,

78. Id. at 364.
79. Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1712 (2009).
Prior to 1875, regulation of immigration was left largely to the states. See generally Gerald
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833 (1993) (reviewing state immigration laws between 1776 and 1875). In 1875,
Congress enacted the first immigration legislation. See Immigration Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch.
376, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1974) (excluding “convict[s], lunatic[s], idiot[s], or any person
unable to take care of himself or herself”); see also Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126,
22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) (prohibiting, inter alia, Chinese laborers from entering the United
States). This legislation dealt largely with excluding aliens but not with deportation of aliens
already admitted to the United States.
80. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1712. Unlawful entry was the primary ground for
deportation under these provisions. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 514 (2009).
81. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
82. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 133 (2007).
83. Id. at 133–34.
84. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 15 (5th ed. 2009).
85. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 54–55 (1950). Under the 1917 Act, advocating anarchy and
crimes of “moral turpitude” made an alien eligible for deportation. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch.
29, 39 Stat. at 889.
86. See 6 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 71.05[1][e][ii] (2012).
87. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. at 889–90; see 6 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra
note 86, § 71.05[1][e][ii].
88. See, e.g., In re L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (BIA 1940).
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Congress continued to broaden the scope of criminal offenses triggering
deportation.89
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 195290 (INA) was the next major
overhaul of federal immigration legislation, and is considered the
“backbone of contemporary immigration law.”91 The INA consolidated
prior immigration legislation92 and further solidified the link between
immigration and criminal law by again expanding the categories of criminal
offenses triggering deportation.93 The INA also eliminated the availability
of JRAD discretionary relief for aliens who had committed narcotics
offenses.94 However, aliens could obtain relief through suspension of
deportation, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, or stay of
deportation.95 Aliens commonly invoked these defenses as a basis for
remaining in the United States.96 Further, prior to 1996, section 212 of the
INA allowed the Attorney General broad discretion to grant deportation
waivers.97

89. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551 (repealed 1952). The 1929 Act
subjected aliens convicted of any offense and sentenced to two or more years in prison to
deportation. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1717; see also Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch.
439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (repealed 1952). This Act made deportation the leading
immigration sanction and further linked criminal law to immigration by expanding the
grounds for deportation to additional classes of offenses. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1716–17.
However, the 1940 Act still provided aliens an avenue of relief, bestowing discretion upon
the Attorney General to suspend deportation for aliens of good moral character when
deportation would cause an economic hardship to the noncitizen’s family. Alien Registration
Act of 1940, ch. 439, sec. 20, § 19(c), 54 Stat. at 672.
90. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
91. Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: Assessing
“Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering
Whether “Immigration Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1, 60 (2010).
92. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 84, at 17.
93. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 515.
94. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2010); see also United States v.
O’Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1954) (recognizing that aliens who had committed a
narcotics offense were no longer eligible for a JRAD under the 1952 Act). In 1990,
Congress retroactively eliminated the JRAD form of relief in its entirety. Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1990)) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)); see also KANSTROOM, supra note 82, at
228.
95. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 244–245, 66 Stat. at 214–17; see also
1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 2.03[2][g]. In 1996, Congress replaced these
avenues of relief with cancellation of removal. See 1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86,
§ 2.04[14][c].
96. See, e.g., Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2013).
97. That section of the INA provided: “Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive
years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)
(1994), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597. Although this provision expressly
applied only to exclusion proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted it to
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In 1996, Congress made another significant contribution to existing
immigration legislation.98 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 199699 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996100 (IIRIRA) broadened the scope of deportable
offenses101 and narrowed the scope of judicial review102 of deportation
matters. The AEDPA and IIRIRA also curtailed the availability of
deportation waivers from the Attorney General. Section 440(d) of the
AEDPA identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would
make an alien ineligible for discretionary waiver relief.103 Section 304(b)
of IIRIRA repealed section 212(c) of the INA,104 replacing it with the more
narrow cancellation of removal provision.105
2. Judicial Action in the Realm of Immigration Law
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not provide Congress the power to
regulate immigration.106 It was, therefore, left to the Supreme Court to
articulate such a source of power.107 The Court first did so in 1889 with the
creation of the plenary powers doctrine in the context of exclusion.108 The
plenary powers doctrine left aliens largely at the mercy of the executive and

allow the Attorney General broad discretion in deportation matters as well. See In re Silva,
16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976).
98. 5 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 64.01[1]; 1 id. § 2.04[14][b].
99. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note
84, at 21.
100. 110 Stat. at 3009-546. IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation proceedings
into “removal” proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2006). IIRIRA also further restricted
the availability of discretionary relief from deportation and purported to exempt certain
immigration decisions from judicial review. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 84, at 22.
101. See 1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 2.04[14][b][vi], [14][c].
102. See KANSTROOM, supra note 82, at 229.
103. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)).
104. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at
3009-597; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at
3009-594 (creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). This provision gives the Attorney General discretion
to cancel removal for only a narrow class of aliens. Those excluded were any aliens
previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.” Id.
106. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 466.
107. Id.
108. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Prior to 1996, exclusion
referred to the refusal to allow a noncitizen entry into the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (repealed 1996); see also Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1307 n.31. By contrast,
deportation referred to the removal of a noncitizen who has entered the United States, legally
or illegally. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 693 (6th ed. 2008). Currently, the distinction between deportation and
exclusion (now referred to as inadmissibility) turns on whether the noncitizen is seeking
admission to the United States or has already been legally admitted. Id. at 508.
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Congress.109 The Supreme Court also found that inherent sovereign power
existed over exclusion.110 Therefore, the constitutional protections afforded
to criminal proceedings were not available in exclusion proceedings.111
Four years later, the Supreme Court applied the plenary powers doctrine in
the context of deportation.112 Using the same reasoning employed in the
context of exclusion, the Court held that the constitutional safeguards of
criminal law are not applicable to deportation proceedings.113 The Court
also characterized deportation as a civil matter for the first time.114 This
label is significant because “civil” matters do not merit the same thorough
procedural review as criminal matters.115 In 1903, however, the Court
extended some protections to immigration matters, holding that an alien is
entitled to due process of law in deportation proceedings.116
Under the classic plenary powers doctrine, judicial review is narrowly
circumscribed in the immigration context.117 While certain cases prove this
to be true,118 scholars have observed that beginning in the 1940s, courts
began to circumvent the classic doctrine through techniques of statutory
interpretation.119 Courts taking this approach often noted the harshness of
109. The doctrine bestows upon Congress and the executive broad and largely exclusive
authority on immigration matters. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711
(1893) (asserting that the power to deport is “an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare”).
110. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
111. See id. at 606. The Court’s decision was unclear as to whether this holding would
also apply to deportation. Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1311.
112. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
113. Id.
114. Id. In 1913, the Supreme Court explicitly determined that deportation was not a
criminal punishment. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). Courts continued to
label deportation as “civil,” but expressed discomfort with that label because of the severity
of the consequence. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)
(questioning, but refusing to reconsider, the “civil” label of deportation); Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (noting that deportation is a “drastic measure”); Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (emphasizing the “high and momentous” stakes in
deportation proceedings); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (referring to the
impact of a deportation order as a “great hardship”).
115. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (1992).
However, scholars have suggested that immigration is no longer properly classified as
completely civil or completely criminal. See generally Kris Kobach, The Quintessential
Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69
ALB. L. REV. 179, 223 (2005) (“The overlap between civil and criminal provisions of
immigration law is also demonstrated by the many actions in the immigration arena that
trigger both civil and criminal penalties.”); Markowitz, supra note 76.
116. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).
117. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(finding that Knauff’s exclusion without a hearing was “reasonable” as required by the 1941
Act because “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as
an alien denied entry is concerned”).
118. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
119. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 567–74
(1990). Motomura describes this phenomenon as “phantom norm decisionmaking.” Id. at
567.
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the deportation consequence.120 Dissenters from opinions adhering to the
classic plenary powers doctrine argued that deportation really constituted a
punishment.121
These cases and the statutes discussed in the prior section demonstrate
the dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding
immigration law, specifically deportation. The increasing availability of
deportation as a consequence for criminal activity,122 coupled with judicial
concern about the harshness of the consequences of deportation,123 laid the
foundation for the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.124 The
next section provides a discussion of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Padilla.
C. Padilla v. Kentucky: A Change in the Landscape of
Collateral Consequences
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that defense
counsel’s inaccurate advice regarding the deportation consequences of the
defendant’s guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This
section describes the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Padilla, the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla, and briefly mentions the
subsequent decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals on remand.
1. Jose Padilla’s Path to the Supreme Court
Jose Padilla, a Honduras native, had been a lawful permanent resident of
the United States for over forty years.125 While in the United States, Padilla
served in the armed forces with honor during the Vietnam War.126 Prior to
his conviction, Padilla resided in California with his wife, three children,
120. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a
great hardship on the individual . . . .”); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300, 304
(2001) (refusing to interpret a statute in a manner that would entirely preclude judicial
review because of the “difficult and significant” constitutional questions such an
interpretation would raise); Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1301–02 (noting the “gravity of the
liberty deprivation at issue” in deportation proceedings and providing examples of the harsh
consequences of deportation).
121. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 320 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Deportation may be as severe a punishment as loss of livelihood.”); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Banishment [by
deportation] is punishment in the practical sense.”); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253,
269 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation . . . is always considered a
punishment.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (“Deportation is punishment.”).
122. See supra Part I.B.1.
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that a noncitizen has the right to effective assistance of
counsel when entering a guilty plea and that that right requires defense counsel to warn a
noncitizen of the deportation consequences of the plea).
125. Id. at 359.
126. Id.
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and an elderly mother-in-law.127 Padilla worked as a “self-employed
tractor-trailer owner.”128 While driving a truck route from California to
Illinois and Michigan, Padilla stopped at a weigh station in Kentucky.129
While at the weigh station, Padilla consented to a search of his truck cab.
This search revealed a substantial amount of marijuana.130 Padilla’s case
was prosecuted in Kentucky state court. Although he testified that he did
not know that he was transporting marijuana until the search, Padilla pled
guilty to “various marijuana-related charges, including trafficking in more
than five pounds of marijuana.”131 This offense is a deportable offense
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).132 However, Padilla relied upon his
counsel’s advice that he “did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so long.”133 Padilla was sentenced to five
years in prison with five years probation.134 While in prison, Padilla was
served with an immigration detainer,135 which meant that after his release
from prison, Padilla faced “virtually mandatory” deportation.136
Padilla appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court for postconviction
relief. He asserted that he would have gone to trial had his lawyer warned
him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.137 The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel did not protect Padilla from erroneous advice about
deportation, because it was merely a collateral consequence of his
conviction.138 Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied relief without an
evidentiary hearing.139 Padilla appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari to decide “whether, as a matter of federal law,
Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which
he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country.”140
The Supreme Court reversed Padilla’s conviction in a seven-to-two vote.
Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion. Justice Alito authored a
concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. The next sections review each
opinion.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 n.1 (2010).
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. at 356.
Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 483.
Id.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359–60.
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2. The Supreme Court Majority
After an exegesis on immigration law, the Court embarked on a doctrinal
discussion of Padilla’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.141 The
Court acknowledged the collateral consequences rule used by lower courts,
including the Kentucky Supreme Court, to evaluate a Strickland claim.142
The Court also acknowledged that removal proceedings are “civil in
nature.”143 However, the Court noted that it had never applied the collateral
consequences rule, and explicitly refused to do so in Padilla.144 The Court
also did not discuss whether the rule was appropriate in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.145 Instead, the Court focused on
the “unique nature of deportation,” which made it difficult to classify as
either a direct or collateral consequence.146 The Court pointed to several
factors to support this conclusion. First, although deportation proceedings
are civil in nature, deportation is a “particularly severe ‘penalty’” with a
nearly automatic result.147 Further, the deportation penalty is so intimately
related to the criminal conviction that it is “‘difficult’ to divorce the penalty
from the conviction in the deportation context.”148 Finally, the Court noted
the particular severity of deportation.149 Based on these factors, the
Supreme Court concluded that “advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”150
Having determined that advice regarding the deportation consequences of
a guilty plea falls within the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel, the Court applied the Strickland test. The Court determined that
the “weight of prevailing professional norms,” along with the clarity of the
immigration statute mandating deportation,151 supports the conclusion that
Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient in misadvising him of the
deportation consequences of his guilty plea.152 The Supreme Court
therefore held that, in order to provide effective assistance of counsel, an
attorney is required to advise his client of the immigration consequences of

141. Id. at 364.
142. Id. at 364–65.
143. Id. at 365.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 365–66.
147. Id.
148. Id. The Court noted that this is due to the “recent changes in . . . immigration law
[that] have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders.” Id. at 366. For an overview of these recent changes, see supra Part I.B.1.
149. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740
(1893)).
150. Id. at 366.
151. Id. at 367. For situations where the law is not as clear or succinct as the removal
statute at issue in Padilla, the Supreme Court limited counsel’s duty to merely providing
notice of a potential adverse consequence of a guilty plea. Id. at 369 & n.10.
152. Id. at 366–69.
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a guilty plea,153 or, where it is unclear whether a guilty plea will result in
deportation, give notice to his client of the potential for immigration
consequences.154
The Supreme Court did not limit the holding of Padilla to instances of
inaccurate advice. The Court further held that Strickland would apply to
Padilla’s claim whether he received incorrect advice or no advice at all
regarding the deportation consequences of his plea.155 Having established
that Padilla’s counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court and remanded
the case for a determination of whether Padilla suffered prejudice under the
second prong of Strickland.156 On remand, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
found that Padilla had demonstrated prejudice under Strickland,157 and
remanded the case to the Hardin Circuit Court to vacate Padilla’s judgment
and conviction.158
3. The Concurring Opinion of Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the result but
wrote separately to address concerns that the majority’s opinion “marks a
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”159 Contrary to the majority’s
opinion, Justice Alito would have affirmed the collateral consequences
rule,160 and limited Sixth Amendment protections to situations involving
inaccurate advice.161 Justice Alito concurred in the result because, in his
view, Padilla’s case fell under the affirmative misadvice exception—
Padilla’s counsel erroneously advised him that he did not have to worry
about deportation consequences when pleading guilty.162 Justice Alito
pointed out that to hold otherwise would be to hold contrary to every
federal court of appeals that had considered the issue.163
Still, for Justice Alito, silence alone would not be enough to satisfy a
counsel’s duty to provide effective assistance.164 Notice of potential
153. Id. at 368. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the “Padilla advisory.”
Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and
the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 18, 19. Justice Scalia
also referred to a “Padilla warning” in dissent. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 1496 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
154. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
155. Id. at 370 (“[T]here is no relevant difference between an act of commission and an
act of omission.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690 (1984))).
156. Id. at 374–75.
157. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
158. Id. at 330–31.
159. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 383 (Alito, J., concurring).
160. Id. For a discussion of the justifications of the collateral consequences rule provided
by Justice Alito, see infra Part I.D.
161. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–76. This follows most closely the majority approach to the
collateral consequences rule. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
162. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–76.
163. Id. at 383.
164. Id. at 387–88.
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consequences must also be provided.165 Specific to the immigration
context, Justice Alito advocated a bright-line rule requiring a defense
attorney who is aware that his client is an alien to “(1) refrain from
unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a
criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that,
if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an
immigration attorney.”166 Justice Alito provided two justifications for this
rule. First, immigration is a “specialized field” in which criminal defense
attorneys do not have expertise and should not be doling out misinformed
advice.167 Second, by putting a client on notice that he may be subject to
deportation, a defense attorney reduces the risk that a client would enter an
uninformed or misinformed guilty plea.168
The principle of stare decisis drove Justice Alito’s concurrence.169
However, the requirement of some form of notice of a potential collateral
consequence, such as deportation, still does not fall squarely within one of
the three commonly accepted versions of the collateral consequences
rule.170 It does, however, address concerns that the collateral consequences
rule provides a perverse incentive for attorneys to remain silent on collateral
consequences.171
4. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, accusing the majority
of “swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”172 Justice Scalia
would have preserved the traditional collateral consequences rule.173
Unlike the concurrence, however, Justice Scalia would have also excluded
inaccurate advice regarding collateral consequences from Sixth Amendment
protections.174 Accordingly, Justice Scalia would have held that Padilla’s
Sixth Amendment challenge had no merit because he only received
inaccurate advice about a collateral consequence of his guilty plea.175
Under a proper textual reading, Justice Scalia reasoned, no other result
could be reached.176

165. Id.
166. Id. at 375. Justice Alito found the majority’s distinction between clear and unclear
consequences unworkable because it would result in confusion among attorneys. Id. For a
discussion of the majority’s distinction between clear and unclear consequences, see supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
167. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 382–84.
170. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
171. See supra note 68.
172. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 388–89.
174. Id. at 387–88. This stance aligns the dissent with the Kentucky approach to the
collateral consequences rule. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
175. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 387–88.
176. See id. at 389–90.

2013]

A GAME CHANGER?

1427

Justice Scalia joined the concurrence’s adherence to the collateral
consequences rule based on the principle of stare decisis,177 and on a textual
reading of the Constitution.178 However, he departs from Justice Alito’s
reasoning with respect to instances of affirmative misadvice regarding a
collateral consequence.179 Instead, Justice Scalia stresses that the same
floodgates issue that prompts the concurrence to advocate retaining the
collateral consequences rule also warrants elimination of the affirmative
misadvice exception and the notice requirement for deportation
consequences.180 Instead, Justice Scalia suggests that a statutory solution
would be most appropriate.181 He envisions legislation that “could specify
which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution
invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must
bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given.”182
D. Justification for and Criticism of Application of the Collateral
Consequences Rule to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The varying treatment of the collateral consequences rule in the three
Padilla opinions discussed above demonstrates that the state of the rule is in
flux. This section presents existing criticisms of and justifications for the
collateral consequences rule to frame the conflict among lower courts
discussed in Part II, infra.
Borrowed from a different but related context, the collateral
consequences rule has been subject to significant criticism. Critics have
asserted that the rule is doctrinally flawed because, as a bright-line rule, it
contradicts the Strickland mandate that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims must be evaluated by an “objective standard of reasonableness.”183
Additionally, one fundamental purpose of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is to ensure that a criminal defendant makes a voluntary and
knowing plea under Brady.184 One critic points out that it is difficult to
understand how a plea could be fully voluntary and knowing without
knowledge of the collateral consequences of that plea.185 Similarly, other
177. Id. at 390 (“[W]e [have never] required advice of counsel regarding consequences
collateral to prosecution.”).
178. Id. (“There is no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required
advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at
hand—to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction
after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction.”).
179. Id. at 391.
180. Id. at 390–91 (“[A]n obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral
consequences has no logical stopping-point. . . . [I]t seems . . . that the concurrence suffers
from the same . . . indeterminacy, the same inability to know what areas of advice are
relevant, attaches to misadvice.”).
181. Id. at 392.
182. Id.
183. Roberts, supra note 26, at 171 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)); see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 712.
184. Roberts, supra note 26, at 171–72.
185. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 178.
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critics note that lawyers cannot effectively advise clients, or effectively
negotiate a plea bargain, without considering collateral consequences.186
Therefore, a rule that does not require an attorney to discuss these collateral
consequences with his client conflicts with that attorney’s duty to advocate
fiercely for his client.187
Despite these criticisms, courts continue to adhere to the rule. The
concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla discuss several major
justifications for this adherence. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in
Padilla reasons that the “collateral-consequences rule expresses an
important truth” that criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding
criminal proceedings, but not regarding other areas of the law.188 Justice
Alito also implicitly raises the “slippery slope” issue. He worries that
abandoning the collateral consequences rule could result in attorneys having
to warn their clients about every possible consequence of a conviction,
which becomes unmanageable.189 Additionally, Justice Scalia provides
textual and doctrinal support for the rule in his dissenting opinion in
Padilla.190 He points out that the Sixth Amendment applies only to
criminal prosecutions, and should have no application to collateral matters
that are largely civil.191 He also observes that the principle of stare decisis
mandates adherence to the collateral consequences rule.192 Finally, Justice
Scalia echoes Justice Alito’s concerns that abandoning the collateral
consequences rule would have “no logical stopping-point,” and would
result in a floodgate of litigation surrounding counsel’s failure to warn of
consequences of a guilty plea previously categorized as collateral.193
II. COURTS CLASH ON THE MEANING OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY FOR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
This Part sets forth the split among courts regarding the impact of Padilla
v. Kentucky on ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Specifically,
courts disagree over whether Padilla upends the traditional collateral
consequences rule. The “no impact” courts have found that Padilla simply
named deportation as an isolated exception to the rule. No impact courts
therefore continue to require defense counsel to warn defendants only of the
186. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 736; Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral
Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 87, 114 (2011).
187. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 736.
188. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 376 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is
unrealistic to expect [criminal defense attorneys] to provide expert advice on matters that lie
outside their area of training and experience.”). For a more complete discussion of Justice
Alito’s concurrence in Padilla, see supra Part I.C.3.
189. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–77.
190. Id. at 389–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 389 (“We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly
related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense.”).
192. See id. at 389–90.
193. See id. at 390.
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narrowly defined direct consequences.194 Conversely, the “innovator”
courts have begun to change their understanding of the consequences of a
guilty plea based on the factors considered by the Padilla Court. These
innovator courts have required defense counsel to warn defendants of
consequences previously considered to be collateral, effectively broadening
the scope of direct consequences.
Presented with traditional collateral consequences that stem
automatically from a plea or a conviction, like the deportation consequence
in Padilla, the no impact courts and the innovator courts have reached
different results based upon their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s
discussion of the collateral consequences rule and the deportation
consequence in Padilla.
The next two sections discuss these
interpretations, found in state court opinions after Padilla.
A. No Impact Courts Find That Padilla’s Holding Is Limited to Deportation
and Does Not Impact the Collateral Consequences Rule
This section addresses opinions from the no impact courts that treat
Padilla as an isolated exception to the collateral consequences rule. These
no impact courts have refused to interpret Padilla in a manner that upsets
the traditional collateral consequences rule.195 As a result, in these
jurisdictions, an attorney still has no duty to warn of traditional collateral
consequences, even those stemming automatically from a guilty plea.
No impact courts considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims
based upon defense counsel’s failure to warn of a traditional collateral
consequence stemming automatically from a guilty plea have determined
that Padilla has no impact on the direct-collateral distinction outside of the
deportation context.196 This section examines opinions by four no impact
courts facing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure to
warn of ineligibility to possess a firearm,197 lifetime predatory offender
registration,198 ineligibility for parole,199 and mandatory forfeiture of a state
pension.200 First, the factual background of each case is introduced. Then,
the courts’ interpretations and applications of Padilla is discussed.

194. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
195. Steele v. State, 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012); Robinson v. State, No. A11550, 2012 WL 118259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012); Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012).
196. Steele, 291 P.3d at 470–71; Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1; Sames, 805 N.W.2d
at 566.
197. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 565–66.
198. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *3.
199. Steele, 291 P.3d at 468.
200. Abraham, 62 A.3d at 344.
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1. Just the Facts: The Factual Backdrop of the No Impact Cases
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures
from which the no impact courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Each of the four no impact cases is discussed in turn.
In Sames v. State,201 defendant Thomas Robert Sames pled guilty to
misdemeanor domestic assault under subdivision 1 of section 609.2242 of
the Minnesota Statutes.202 Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that section, a
person convicted of a misdemeanor domestic assault involving a firearm
automatically forfeits the right to possess that firearm.203 Approximately
one month later, after sentencing, Sames moved to withdraw his guilty plea
on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.204
Sames argued that his counsel failed to inform him that the plea could
render him ineligible to possess a firearm.205 In his moving papers, Sames
asserted that this consequence was particularly serious for him because he
was an avid hunter, and he supplied much of his family’s food by
hunting.206 The district court denied Sames’s motion, and he appealed.207
In Robinson v. State,208 defendant Tony Terrell Robinson entered an
Alford plea209 to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.210
A person convicted of that offense is automatically subject to mandatory
lifetime predatory offender registration.211 Robinson’s counsel informed
him of the registration requirement, but did not specify that it was a lifetime
requirement.212
After sentencing, Robinson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting
that it was invalid because he did not know about the lifetime registration
requirement.213 The district court denied the motion, and Robinson
appealed, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his lawyer did not advise him that his plea required lifetime
predatory offender registration.214
In Steele v. State,215 defendant Earl Wayne Steele entered an Alford plea
to one count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age.216 A
201. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 565.
202. Id. at 566.
203. MINN STAT. ANN. § 609.2242 subdiv. 3 (West 2009).
204. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 566.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012).
209. The Alford plea was established in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). By
entering an Alford plea, the defendant accepts all ramifications of a guilty verdict without
admitting to having committed the crime. Id. at 37.
210. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West
2009).
211. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013).
212. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012).
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person convicted of that crime is subject to mandatory predatory offender
registration.217 The district court sentenced Steele to fifteen years in
prison.218 Steele filed a petition for postconviction relief.219 He asserted
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to warn him
that his plea could render him ineligible for parole.220 The district court
denied the petition, and Steele appealed.221
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Abraham,222 defendant Joseph Abraham, a
high school teacher, pled guilty to one count of corruption of a minor and
one count of indecent assault.223 A conviction for indecent assault triggers
the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act224 (PEPFA). Under the Act,
no public employee can receive any retirement or other benefit if he pleads
guilty to a crime related to public employment.225 Abraham filed a motion
to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied.226 He subsequently filed
a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel because his lawyer failed to inform him that he would forfeit his
pension upon pleading guilty.227
The postconviction relief court denied the petition, finding that counsel
was not ineffective.228 On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that
under Padilla, defense counsel was required to warn criminal defendants of
“definite, immediate and automatic” consequences, such as pension
forfeiture.229 The Commonwealth appealed, asking the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether, in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, the
distinction in Pennsylvania between direct and collateral consequences . . .
is appropriate.”230
2. The Interpretive Gloss: The No Impact Courts’ Assessment of Padilla
This section details the arguments asserted by the defendants in the no
impact cases. It also tracks the courts’ responses to those arguments and
the reasoning by which the courts concluded that Padilla has no impact on

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
344.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 468; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (2004 & Supp. 2013).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8304 (2004).
Steele, 291 P.3d at 468.
Id.
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 469.
62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012).
Id. at 344.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1311–1315 (West 2009); see also Abraham, 62 A.3d at
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1312–1313.
See Abraham, 62 A.3d at 344.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
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the direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
The defendants in the no impact cases asserted that similarities between
deportation and the collateral consequence at issue in their cases should
compel the court to dispose of the collateral consequences rule,231 create
additional exceptions to it,232 or find the consequence at issue to be a direct
consequence.233
For example, in Abraham, the defendant put forth two alternative
arguments urging the court to reconsider the collateral consequences rule in
light of Padilla. First, the defendant argued that “Padilla [did] not require
[the c]ourt to abandon the direct versus collateral consequence analysis.”234
Instead, the defendant urged an interpretation of Padilla that “requires . . .
the reviewing court [to] consider the severity of the consequences
implicated by a plea, the real effect of the consequence on the defendant
and the burden on counsel of providing advice as to the consequence.”235
The defendant argued that pension forfeiture under PEPFA was a
particularly severe consequence and was difficult to divorce from the
conviction. Defendant pointed out that under PEPFA, he was required to
forfeit his “primary source of income,” and that this forfeiture affected not
only defendant, but also his wife, who would forfeit pension benefits
“should Mr. Abraham predecease her.”236 Defendant observed that the
pension forfeiture was far more severe than the criminal sanction of three
years’ probation.237
Furthermore, the defendant asserted that pension forfeiture under PEPFA
is “inseparable from the criminal process.”238 The defendant concluded,
therefore, that like deportation in Padilla, pension forfeiture under PEPFA
“does not fall readily into the traditional direct versus collateral
consequence analysis.”239 Given the severity of the pension forfeiture and
its intimate relationship to the criminal charge, the defendant urged the
court to hold that counsel was required to warn of that consequence.240
While the no impact courts acknowledged that, like deportation, these
collateral consequences could be seen as “intimately related to the criminal
231. Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17,
2012); Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Steele v. State, 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012)
(No. 38794-2011) (“Padilla . . . holds that counsel must inform clients of consequences that
will occur after sentencing even when they are not direct or even criminal law
consequences.”).
232. Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 566, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); Brief of the
Appellee at 6, Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012) (No. 36 WAP 2010),
2011 WL 2646523.
233. Brief of the Appellee, supra note 232, at 7–14.
234. Id. at 8.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 12.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 19.
239. Id. at 12.
240. Id.
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process” and were perhaps “nearly an automatic result” of a guilty plea,241
they did not consider these factors dispositive.
Instead, several
countervailing considerations prevailed, resulting in determinations that
Padilla’s holding is limited to deportation.
First, the no impact courts emphasized the Supreme Court’s narrow focus
on deportation in Padilla. The Supreme Court began the Padilla decision
with a recitation of the history of immigration law designed to demonstrate
the “unique nature of deportation.”242 The no impact courts noted that the
Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide whether the direct-collateral
distinction was appropriate in the ineffective assistance of counsel
context.243 Further, the no impact courts observed that the Supreme Court
failed to mention the myriad of other consequences that stem automatically
from a guilty plea.244 Based on these observations, the no impact courts
reasoned that only the “unique nature of deportation” justified disregarding
the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.245 Therefore,
the no impact courts determined that Padilla had no relevance to the
collateral consequences rule outside of the deportation context.246
Second, no impact courts placed importance upon the precedential value
of the collateral consequences rule,247 which has traditionally been followed
in some of the jurisdictions of the no impact courts.248 Likewise, the
collateral consequences at issue were traditionally considered collateral

241. Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012).
But see Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 348, 350 (Pa. 2012) (acknowledging that
pension forfeiture resulted automatically from the defendant’s guilty plea, but finding that
such a consequence is not so “enmeshed in the criminal process” as to render the collateral
consequences rule inapplicable).
242. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *4; Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 570; Abraham, 62 A.3d at
347.
243. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *4 (quoting Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 570); Sames, 805
N.W.2d at 570 (“[T]he Court did not clearly state that the direct-collateral distinction should
not be applied in cases not involving the risk of deportation.”); see also Steele, 291 P.3d 466,
470 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he Court explicitly stated that it was not deciding whether
the distinction between direct and collateral consequences defines the scope of effective
assistance of counsel . . . .”); Abraham, 62 A.3d at 347 (“[T]he Court declined to rule on the
specific question . . . whether the direct versus collateral consequences analysis is
appropriate in assessing a claim of ineffectiveness in connection with entry of a plea.”).
244. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *4; Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 569–70.
245. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *4; see also Steele, 291 P.3d at 470; Sames, 805
N.W.2d at 569–70; Abraham, 62 A.3d at 351 (“[T]he loss of deferred compensation . . .
cannot be said to be so onerous as to be on the same plane as incarceration or deportation.”).
246. Steele, 291 P.3d at 470; Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1; Sames, 805 N.W.2d at
566; Abraham, 62 A.3d at 348–50.
247. See Steele, 291 P.3d at 469–70; Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *2; Sames, 805
N.W.2d at 567–69.
248. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 937 (Idaho 1999); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d
573, 578 (Minn. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010).
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consequences in those jurisdictions.249 The Padilla Court’s narrow focus
on deportation, coupled with the well-established nature of the collateral
consequences rule, was not enough for the no impact courts to interpret
Padilla as effecting a sea change in the realm of ineffective assistance of
counsel jurisprudence.250 For these courts, Padilla was simply an exception
to a well-established and viable rule. Therefore, the no impact courts
denied the defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty
plea.
B. Innovator Courts Find That Padilla Requires Defense Attorneys To
Warn of Other Traditional Collateral Consequences That Stem
Automatically from a Guilty Plea
In conflict with the no impact courts, which interpreted Padilla as
preserving the traditional collateral consequences rule,251 innovator courts
have construed Padilla as upsetting the traditional direct-collateral
distinction in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This
section addresses decisions from innovator courts252 that have reconsidered
the definition of a direct consequence in light of the factors considered in
the context of deportation in Padilla.253 As a result, innovator courts have
required defense counsel to warn their clients of certain collateral
consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea.254 Effectively,
these innovator courts have recast certain collateral consequences stemming
automatically from a guilty plea as direct consequences.255
1. Just the Facts: The Factual Backdrop of the Innovator Cases
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures
from which the innovator courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Each of the three innovator cases is discussed in turn.

249. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 702 P.2d 893, 896 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
parole consequences are not direct consequences of a guilty plea); Robinson, 2012 WL
118259, at *2 (citing Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 905, 907 (Minn. 2002)) (finding that
mandatory predatory offender registration is a collateral consequence in Minnesota); State v.
Rodriguez, 590 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that loss of eligibility to
possess a firearm is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea in Minnesota).
250. See Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 567–68.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Pridham,
394 S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
253. See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
254. See Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 389; Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 878; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d
at 895–96.
255. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387 (“Padilla . . . calls into question the application of the
direct versus collateral consequences distinction in the context of ineffective assistance
claims.”); see also Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 879 (“[W]e cannot agree that [Padilla’s] holding
implicates no collateral consequence but deportation.”); Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893–95.
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In Taylor v. State,256 defendant Curtis Lane Taylor pled guilty to two
counts of child molestation.257 This offense is one of the specified offenses
in the Georgia sex offender statute.258 Taylor was, therefore, subject to
mandatory registration as a sex offender.259
After sentencing, Taylor met with his probation officer, who explained
the sex offender registration requirement.260 After this initial meeting with
the probation officer, Taylor filed a handwritten letter with the trial court
asking to withdraw his guilty plea.261 Taylor asserted ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the sex offender
registration requirement prior to entry of the guilty plea.262
The trial court denied Taylor’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
invoking the collateral consequences rule.263 The trial court found that
because sex offender registry was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea,
counsel was not required to advise Taylor of that consequence.264 Taylor
appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.265
In People v. Fonville,266 defendant Derek Fonville pled guilty to one
count of child enticement.267 Child enticement is a listed offense in
Michigan’s sex offender registry act.268 By virtue of pleading guilty,
therefore, Fonville was required to register as a sex offender.269
At the sentencing hearing, Fonville’s counsel informed the trial court that
Fonville wished to withdraw his guilty plea, and Fonville stated that he
wanted a jury trial.270 Fonville asserted that he did not believe he was
guilty of child enticement, and that when he entered the plea, he was
unaware that he would have to register as a sex offender.271 The trial court
denied Fonville’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and sentenced him to
a term of fifty-one months to twenty years in prison.272
After sentencing, Fonville moved once again to withdraw his guilty plea,
but the trial court denied the motion.273 Fonville appealed this to the

256. 698 S.E.2d at 384.
257. Id. at 385.
258. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B)(viii) (Supp. 2013).
259. Id. § 42-1-12(e)(2) (“Registration pursuant to this Code section shall be required by
any individual who . . . [i]s convicted . . . of a dangerous sexual offense [such as child
molestation].”).
260. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 385–86.
261. Id. at 386.
262. Id. at 385–86.
263. Id. at 386.
264. Id. at 386, 389.
265. Id. at 389.
266. 804 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
267. Id. at 882; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.350 (West Supp. 2013).
268. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722(w)(iii) (West 2012).
269. Id. § 28.723.
270. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 882–83.
271. See id. at 883.
272. See id. at 884, 885.
273. Id. at 885.
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Michigan Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Michigan.274 Both
appeals were denied.275
Fonville subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial
court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not
informed of the sex offender registration requirement.276 The trial court
denied the motion, invoking the collateral consequences rule.277 The court
found that defense counsel’s failure to inform Fonville of the sex offender
registration requirement, a collateral consequence of the plea, did not
constitute ineffective assistance.278 Fonville appealed, and the Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed.279
In Commonwealth v. Pridham,280 defendant Pridham pled guilty to one
count of manufacturing methamphetamine (second offense), one count of
complicity to commit unlawful distribution of methamphetamine, and one
count of fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child.281
Under Kentucky’s “violent offender” statute, convictions for these offenses
automatically limit parole eligibility.282 The trial court accepted Pridham’s
plea and sentenced him to thirty years in prison.283
After sentencing, Pridham moved for relief from judgment. He asserted
that defense counsel assured him that he would be eligible for parole after
completing twenty percent, or six years, of his thirty-year sentence.284 The
“violent offender” statute, however, rendered Pridham ineligible for parole
for twenty years.285 Pridham argued that counsel’s misadvice constituted
ineffective assistance.286
The trial court denied Pridham’s motion based on the collateral
consequences rule.287
Because parole eligibility was a collateral
consequence, the court held that counsel’s misadvice regarding that
consequence did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance.288 Pridham
appealed. While his appeal was pending,289 the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Padilla v. Kentucky.290 The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that
adverse parole consequences were comparable to the deportation
consequences in Padilla, and that Pridham’s motion for relief alleged a
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
2007).
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 895–96.
394 S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012).
Id. at 871; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.1432, .1438, .1444 (LexisNexis
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401; see also Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 871.
Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id.
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.291 The court of appeals
therefore remanded to the trial court to determine whether defense counsel
actually did misadvise Pridham.292 The Commonwealth of Kentucky
moved for discretionary review, asking the Kentucky Supreme Court to
determine whether the court of appeals read Padilla too broadly.293
2. The Interpretive Gloss: Innovator Courts’ Assessment of Padilla
This part surveys the defendants’ arguments in the innovator cases. It
also sets out the courts’ responses to those arguments and the reasoning by
which the courts concluded that Padilla required a change in the traditional
direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
Each innovator court discussed above is located in a jurisdiction that
subscribed to the collateral consequences rule prior to Padilla.294 The
consequences at issue in each case were traditionally considered collateral
consequences,295 but were also automatically triggered by a guilty plea.296
The defendants in these cases asserted that these traditional collateral
consequences they faced as a result of pleading guilty should be considered
direct consequences in light of Padilla.297 One court explicitly agreed with
the defendants,298 and two courts’ holdings implicitly affirmed the
defendants’ arguments.299 Several considerations drove these courts to
determine that Padilla’s holding requires certain collateral consequences
stemming automatically from a guilty plea to be termed direct.

291. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 872.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1999); Commonwealth v.
Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla, 559
U.S. at 356; People v. Davidovich, 606 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
295. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 183 (Ga. 2010). This case concerned a
trial court’s duty to a defendant under the Fifth Amendment. Further discussion of it is
therefore outside the scope of this Note. See also Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d
558, 567 (Ky. 2006); In re Lyons, No. 217858, 2000 WL 33389824, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2000).
296. See supra text accompanying note 254.
297. People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 892 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (“Fonville contends
that registration as a sex offender is an immediate and absolute effect of his conviction.”).
298. Id. at 892–95 (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that mandatory sex offender
registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea).
299. The Court of Appeals of Georgia, while not explicitly holding that sex offender
registration is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, effectively did so by requiring defense
counsel to warn of that consequence. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388–89 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010) (“[F]ailure to advise a client that his guilty plea will require registration [as a sex
offender] is constitutionally deficient performance.”). The Kentucky Court of Appeals held
to the same effect regarding parole ineligibility, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the misadvice or nonadvice occurred. See Commonwealth v. Pridham,
394 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Ky. 2012) (concluding that trial counsel’s misadvice concerning
parole eligibility, if proven, would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under
Padilla).
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First, instead of viewing Padilla as an outlier decision, these courts
determined that Padilla called into question the precedential value of the
collateral consequences rule in the context of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.300 One court noted that deportation had been historically
considered a collateral consequence in its jurisdiction.301 Since Padilla
abrogated that characterization and refused to employ the collateral
consequences rule at all,302 these courts reasoned that Padilla also cast
doubt on existing direct-collateral characterizations of other
consequences.303 Therefore, these courts felt it was necessary to reassess
those consequences in light of Padilla.
In contrast with the no impact courts,304 the innovator courts did not
interpret Padilla as focusing narrowly on deportation. Instead, these courts
found that Padilla changed the inquiry about what constitutes a direct
consequence for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.305 Innovator courts used several factors articulated by the Supreme
Court in Padilla306 to reshape the definition of a direct consequence:
prevailing professional norms,307 the severity of the consequence,308
whether the consequence is “intimately related to the criminal process,”309
and whether the consequence is “nearly an automatic result” of the
conviction or plea.310 Abandoning the traditional definition of a direct
consequence of a guilty plea, these courts determined that the Padilla
factors now controlled the scope of direct consequences of a guilty plea.311
Using these factors, the innovator courts determined that mandatory sex
offender registration and ineligibility for parole qualified as direct
consequences of a guilty plea.312 One court noted that these determinations
300. See supra text accompanying note 297.
301. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 895 (“[W]e recognize that this Court held in People v.
Davidovich that the possibility that a defendant would be deported was a collateral . . .
consequence . . . .”).
302. See, e.g., Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 877; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
365 (2010).
303. See supra text accompanying note 297.
304. See supra Part II.A.
305. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 387–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Pridham, 394 S.W.3d
at 878–79, 886; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893–94.
306. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
307. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–88; Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 879; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at
894.
308. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–88; Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 878; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at
893–94.
309. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–89 (detailing the “severe ramifications” of sex offender
registration, including public dissemination of the individual’s name on the sex offender
registry, and restrictions on where to “live, work, and volunteer”); Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at
872; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893–94.
310. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388; see also Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 878; Fonville, 804
N.W.2d at 893–94.
311. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–88; Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893–94.
312. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–88 (“In light of these [Padilla] factors, . . . the failure to
advise a client that pleading guilty will require him to register as a sex offender is
constitutionally deficient performance.”); Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 886 (“In sum, under
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ran contrary to prior case law.313 However, the innovator courts found their
conclusions necessary in light of the newly articulated ineffective assistance
of counsel inquiry and standard in Padilla.314
III. RESHAPING THE DEFINITION OF DIRECT CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
This Part first assesses the viability of the collateral consequences rule
for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and finds that the
rule should be preserved because it serves a valid purpose. Next, this Part
considers the immigration motivations for the Padilla Court’s decision, and
finds that, despite the “unique” nature of deportation, courts should employ
the Padilla advisory to redefine the scope of direct consequences for
purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.315 This Note
concludes that lower courts should preserve the collateral consequences rule
but abolish the current bright-line definition of direct consequences in light
of the Supreme Court’s discussion of deportation in Padilla.
A. The Collateral Consequences Rule Serves an Important Purpose
The collateral consequences rule was not created for use in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.316 Nevertheless, almost every
lower court in the United States uses the rule.317 Therefore, the relevant
question to ask is whether the collateral consequences rule serves a valid
purpose in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
Despite scathing criticism of the rule,318 the prudent discussions of the rule
in Padilla in Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent,319 and
other practical considerations, suggest that the rule does serve a valid
purpose.

Padilla the collateral consequences rule must yield in those cases where a defendant’s guilty
plea was induced by his attorney’s misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of the plea
sufficiently punitive, grave, and enmeshed with the plea’s direct consequences . . . .”);
Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 894–95 (“[A]pplying the Padilla rationale to this case supports a
holding that defense counsel must advise a defendant that registration as a sexual offender is
a consequence of the defendant’s guilty plea.”).
313. See, e.g., Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893 n.60 (“A direct consequence must affect the
range of punishment in a definite, immediate, and largely automatic way. The registration
requirement has absolutely no effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment for the
crime . . . .” (quoting State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
314. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388–89; Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 878–79, 886; Fonville, 804
N.W.2d at 894–95.
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See supra Part I.A.1–2.c.
317. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 188–90, 192 and accompanying text.
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As Justice Alito shrewdly observed, in the absence of the collateral
consequences rule, attorneys may be obligated to warn clients about each
and every possible potential consequence of a guilty plea.320 This scenario
is unworkable from the standpoint of criminal defense attorneys, judges,
and general practicality.
Criminal defense attorneys are, by definition, experts at navigating
criminal proceedings321—guilty pleas included. However, these attorneys
do not possess that same level of expertise for other areas of the law,322
which may relate to collateral consequences of the criminal proceeding. It
is unrealistic to expect criminal defense attorneys to quickly become experts
in these areas in order to anticipate a vast array of potential consequences of
a guilty plea for each client.323 The collateral consequences rule is an
important benchmark upon which attorneys can rely in order to ensure that
they are providing effective assistance of counsel.
From a judicial perspective, eliminating the collateral consequences rule
would disrupt years of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.324
Courts would no longer have a reliable benchmark upon which to evaluate
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. This raises
judicial consistency and reliance concerns, although for different reasons
than those articulated by Justice Scalia.325
However, an even more pressing concern exists. Without the collateral
consequences rule, judges have a higher level of discretion over which
consequences a defense attorney must warn his client about. Different
judges in the same jurisdiction may have differing views on what
constitutes effective assistance, resulting in unpredictable ineffective
assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Further, eliminating the collateral
consequences rule would open the door to a myriad of new foundations for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If some of these claims are put
forth in bad faith, or in an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea after a change
of heart, judicial economy suffers.
B. While Deportation Is “Different,”326 Padilla Should Prompt Lower
Courts To Reshape the Definition of Direct Consequences
The Supreme Court made clear that the motivations underlying the
Padilla decision stemmed primarily from concerns regarding immigration
law and the nature of deportation.327 Deportation is a unique consequence
320. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia was concerned that
the Court cited no precedent upon which to support its mandate for defense counsel to warn
of immigration consequences. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
326. Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1299.
327. See supra Part I.C.1; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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of a guilty plea.328 However, this does not mean that Padilla cannot have
any implications for the collateral consequences rule in the broader context
of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Padilla raises an
important point: while certain consequences of a guilty plea may have
appeared quite distinct from the criminal conviction in the past, they are
now so intimately linked that a rethinking of the definition of direct
consequences is in order.329 Therefore, courts should interpret Padilla as
requiring that defense counsel advise criminal defendants of other
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty
plea.330
1. Deportation Really Is “Different”
In Padilla, the Supreme Court cited no precedent for its decision to
require defense counsel to warn criminal defendants of the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea.331 Instead, the Court referenced the
“severity” of the deportation consequence for noncitizens like Jose
Padilla.332 The Court proceeded to hold that Padilla’s counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to warn Padilla that pleading guilty would
result in his deportation.333 This rhetoric, and the subsequent holding,
harkens back to earlier immigration cases that cited similar concerns.334
Padilla is best situated in the context of these immigration cases, continuing
a Supreme Court trend of affording additional (and in this case,
constitutional) rights to aliens.335
Deportation is a high-stakes consequence for noncitizens.336 Although
certain other consequences of a criminal conviction can change the life of a
defendant, none do so as drastically as automatic forcible removal from the
country in which one resides.337 In recognition of this fact, the neat
categorization of deportation as “civil” is slowly eroding.338 Over the past
century, and especially over the past twenty years, immigration and
criminal law have become enmeshed in an unprecedented way.339
Commentators have suggested that immigration no longer falls squarely
into the civil or criminal category.340
It appears that the Supreme Court has recognized this change in Padilla.
While employing the traditional “civil” label to describe deportation, the
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Court also qualified that label, noting that deportation is “intimately related
to the criminal process.”341 While courts have recognized that certain other
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty
plea are also intimately related to the criminal process,342 none of these
consequences has the rich history that deportation does. Further, none of
these consequences has been said to straddle the civil-criminal divide in the
same way as immigration consequences.
Based on the unique nature of deportation, the Supreme Court in Padilla
refused to employ the collateral consequences rule in its evaluation of
Padilla’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.343 However, it is
important to note that the Court also did not expressly invalidate the rule.344
As previously discussed, the collateral consequences rule serves a valid
purpose.345 Therefore, courts are correct to find that Padilla did not
abrogate the rule.346 Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court felt the
need to depart from precedent in order to reach a just outcome suggests that
the rule in its current form requires certain changes. Courts that treat
Padilla as an outlier decision and interpret the opinion as leaving the
collateral consequences rule completely intact have overlooked this
important point.347
2. Padilla v. Kentucky Should Prompt Courts To Rethink the Definition of
Direct Consequences for the Purposes of an Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claim
While the operation of the collateral consequences rule in the ineffective
assistance of counsel context serves valid purposes, the definition of direct
consequences in that context need not necessarily mirror that used in Fifth
Amendment due process jurisprudence. The language surrounding the
Supreme Court’s discussion of the nature of a deportation consequence348
should prompt lower courts to redefine direct consequences for purposes of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Currently, the scope of the direct-collateral distinction follows the line
separating civil consequences from criminal consequences.349 Even though
some courts define direct consequences as those that are “definite,
immediate and largely automatic,”350 the civil-criminal divide seems to be

341. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 241, 312 and accompanying text.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 144–46.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 144–46.
345. See supra Part III.A.
346. See supra Part II.A–B.
347. See supra Part II.A.
348. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
350. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); see also supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
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what truly drives the distinction.351 As some of the post-Padilla cases have
demonstrated, consequences triggered automatically upon entry of a guilty
plea or upon conviction, such as sex offender registration or forfeiture of a
state pension, have nevertheless been considered collateral because they are
civil, not criminal, in nature.352 However, the fact that a consequence is
civil does not mean that it cannot have severe and debilitating effects on a
defendant.353 Not requiring defense counsel to advise criminal defendants
of collateral (in essence, civil) consequences of a guilty plea as a
categorical matter draws an arbitrary and unfair line for viable ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.354
Instead, courts should employ a more functional definition of direct
consequences. This definition would incorporate analysis from Strickland,
the doctrinal foundation of ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence,355 and the Padilla factors that the Supreme Court considered
when exempting deportation from the traditional rule.356 Strickland
mandates a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, rejecting application of a bright-line rule.357 However, in the
absence of any sort of rule, courts would have no baseline with which to
evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, while
adhering to the collateral consequences rule, courts should adopt a case-bycase determination of what constitutes a direct consequence for each
particular defendant. In doing so, courts should consider the factors
focused on by the Padilla Court: the severity of the consequence for the
particular defendant, whether the consequence results automatically from
the conviction, and whether the consequence is so closely related to the
conviction that it is difficult to separate the two.358
While criminal defense attorneys are certainly experts at navigating
criminal proceedings,359 they are also experts in another area—their clients.
Therefore, although it may be unrealistic to expect criminal defense
attorneys to become versed in any area of the law which may be implicated
by a particular guilty plea, it is not overly burdensome to require attorneys
to understand which potential consequences may be most important to their
351. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also supra note 241 and
accompanying text.
352. See supra Part II.A.
353. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); see also supra notes 197, 309
and accompanying text.
354. One justification for this bright line has been that the Sixth Amendment assistance of
counsel protections do not apply for civil proceedings. See supra note 191 and
accompanying text. However, there is a difference between having the right to counsel in a
civil proceeding and requiring criminal defense counsel to warn of potential civil
consequences. Requiring a criminal defense counsel to warn a criminal defendant of severe
civil consequences does not equate to affording the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a
civil proceeding.
355. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
356. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364–65; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
358. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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clients, and to advise their clients accordingly. This formulation of the rule
avoids any potential “perverse incentives” for a defense attorney to decline
to provide advice about “collateral consequences,” such as those involved
with the affirmative misadvice exception employed by some lower
courts.360 In fact, it creates positive incentives for criminal defense
attorneys to ensure that their clients are informed of the potential
consequences most important to them.
Padilla’s holding should prompt lower courts to reconsider the definition
of direct consequences when applying the collateral consequences rule.361
The factors considered by the Supreme Court in Padilla provide an
excellent foundation upon which to redefine the scope of “direct
consequences” of a guilty plea.362 This remains true even though the
Court’s motivations stemmed primarily from concerns regarding
immigration law.363
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky364 that a defense
counsel must advise his client of the potential deportation consequences of
a guilty plea.365 In so holding, the Court refused to validate the collateral
consequences rule for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.366 Instead, the Court focused on the unique qualities of deportation,
a traditional collateral consequence, that make it an exception to that
rule.367
Despite this Supreme Court decision, the collateral consequences rule has
important application in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. For practical and policy reasons, lower courts should not interpret
Padilla as eradicating the collateral consequences rule.368 However, given
the criteria invoked in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the deportation
consequence in Padilla, and the Strickland mandate that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, lower
courts should redefine “direct consequence” for the purposes of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim so that other traditional collateral
consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea may properly be
considered direct.369 Courts should employ the factors considered by the
Supreme Court in Padilla, determining which consequences of a guilty plea
are particularly severe for an individual defendant and labeling all other
consequences collateral. This creates proper incentives for attorneys to
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 305–11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.2; see also supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.B.
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warn defendants of the consequences most important to them, and for
defendants to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in good
faith.

